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While most tiabfity policies con-
tu¡ a duty to indemnify, which is
subject to a limit of liability clause,
they also featute a dutY to defend
which is vitually unlimited. Insurers
have developed a policy in which the
"limit of liability'' available to indem-
nify the insured against verdrcts or
settlements is reduced by the costs of
defense. Such a policy is called a
"defense within limits" (DwL) policy,
also known as "wastitlp"t
"cannibalizing,"'self-consuming"' or
"self liquidating"' because its available
indemnity limit may be eaten or
"v¡asted" by the costs of defense. The
industry adopted DWL policy Provi-
sions for medical malpractice policies
in the 1970s in response to Patient
claims that were increasing in number
and size. Insurers incoqpotated DWL
provisions for directors' and officers'
policies for corporate boards during
the 1980s in response to heavy de-
fense costs involved in the savings and
loan cases and toxic tort litigation. In
the 1980s, insurers placed DWL into
legal malpractice insurance. At that
tine, lawyers s/ere concemed that the
industry was forcing them to change
from "occurrence" to "claims-made"
policies, and the fact that the insurers
had inserted DWL provisions into
those same policies went virtually un-
noticed. I have surveyed lawyers at
CLEs in Montana and leamed that
even toda¡ most do not know they
have DWL policies, and do not apPre-
ciate the impotance of those provi-
sions.
Reasons for development of the
DWL policy provisions
fnsurers developed D!(iL poli-
cies because costs of defense in the
high-risk cases involved in profes-
sional liability insurance and directors'
and officers' insurance commonly
equal costs of indemnity and often
exceed limits of liability. While this has
prompted insurers to limit their duty
to defend, it is hard to see how DWL
policies benefit insurance consumers.
!Øhen the professional liability insur-
ers inserted the D!íL provisions, they
abandoned their nominally unlimited
duty to defend and promised only
defense insofar as its costs fit in the
limit of mon ey avatla;ble for indemnity.
Insurers contend that they had to
adopt DWL because e4penses in de-
fending claims wete rivaling losses
paid. This has probably always been
true, and the real problem here is that
claim complexity, policy limits, and
costs of defense are proportional. By
the 1980s, the policy limits bought for
predicted high-risk liability protection
had simply growrì to a size where the
insurers were unwilling to make an
equal commitrnent for risk of defense
expenditures.
The emergence of DWL provi-
sions meant that consumers of Direc-
tors' & Officers'; Errors & Omis-
sions, and some Commercial General
coverages now have to calculate their
potential loss exposure as well as the
potential costs of defense in buying
their insurance. Whether they gain any
tangible benefit is questionable. Indus-
try asserts that the insured can obtain
significant savings by purchasing
DWL policies.o Flo-.rr.., such asser-
tions must be tested against the fact
that the dsk-averse insured must now
double limits to cover the amount
deducted for costs of defense. At least
one âctuary asserts that there is no
need for DWL provisions in liability
policies because actuanal rate making
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procedures allow pricing of such poli-
cies at a profitable level without de-
ducting dåfe.,se costs from the limit.s
DWL policy provisions
The DWL policy forrn from the
fnsura¡rce Services Office, Inc., the
trade organization for the industry
generally features three modificaüons
from the standud ISO forrn casualty
policy. First, the basic insuring agree-
ment traditionally provides that the
company's obligation to pay or defend
temrinates when the limit of the com-
pany's liability has been exhausted by
payment of judgment or settlement.
For DWL, that provision is modified
so that the limit can be exhausted not
only by payrnent of judgments or set-
tlements but also by "claims ex-
penses." Second, the limit of liabiliry
clause is altered so that the
"aggregate" limit of the company's
liability includes not only damages but
also "claims expenses." The limit of
liability clause may also provide that
"claims expenses" are subtracted
from the limit of liability before in-
demnity and that the company has the
right to withdrau¡ when the limits ate
exhausted. The limit of liability clause
may then provide for a "deductible"
and "reimbursement" in the event the
insurer has indemnified or paid de-
fense expenses that exceed the limit of
liability. Third the policy will clrry arr
addiuonal definition for "claims ex-
penses" so that the tenn will cover all
legal defense costs.
In the area of legal malpractice in
1999, the ABÂ reports that 42 of rhe
47 insurers providing coverage include
defense costs within their limits of
liability.6 About t2 of rhe companies
allow exceptions by endorsement'
which likely inr olves increased premi-
ums. Some include defense costs in
limits after an annual, i.e., $50,000,
defense allowance or a $25,000 per
lawyer annual defense allowance.
Some make supplemental defense
coverage available either as a percent-
age of the per claim limit, i.e., 25o/o, or
a set amount, i.e., $500,000 or a com-
bination, i.e., the lesser oÊ $100,000 or
50% of the per claim limit.s
Misrepresentations in marketing
the DWL policy
Because of the marked change in
coverage between a policy that pro-
vides an unrestdcted duty to defend
and a pohcy providing DWL, counsel
should watch for intentional or negli-
gent misrepresentation if the insur-
ance interrnediaries doing the market-
ing are not careful in representing lim-
its of liability. Sales materials or policy
language indicating that a policy has
"indemnity'' limits of a certøin
amount, v¡hen in fact the limit is sub-
iect to deducLion for expenses of de-
fense would raise dsk of misrepresen-
tation. Even stating limits of liability
may involve the same risk absent
some language of notice in the policy
that defense expenses are deducted
from the available limrt.
Oregon requires that the DWL
policy forrn give notice that defense
costs are deducted from the limits
avalable for liability.e Montana has no
such provision. A policy containing
representations about liability limits
and also containing DWL provisions
might be found to be ambiguous by
reason of conflicting provisions, or
because the policy layout and design
misleads or allows the insured to have
a reasonable e¡pectation that it con-
tains a limit of liAÞility unfettered by
defense .*parrrar.to
Rights and duties of the parties
r nder the DWL policy
Under the DWL policy, there is
an inherent conflict between the in-
sured and the insurer in every case
where payment of the potential loss
plus paynent of predicted defense
costs could exceed the limrts of liabil-
ity since every dollar spent on defense
of the claim is a dollar that will not be
avaiTaÏ¡le for settlement or satisf¿ction
of judgement. The problem is that the
insured has a direct interest in assuring
that the limit of liability is available for
settlement or payment of judgment,
while the insurer may be interested in
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defending on the merits. It may be in
the financial interest of a dsk-averse
insurecl to offer the entire limits even
in a case of poor liabiliry rather than
run risk that hard fought defense will
deplete the limits and block settlement
later or leave an unsatisfied judgment.
It may be in the insurer's interest, on
the other hand, to establish through
hard fought defense that "nuisance"
claims will not invoke any settlement
offers from this insurance company.
Because the insured under a
DWL policy must evaluate both risk
of loss and risk of defense costs, it
may now be necessary that defense
counsel provide the insured full infor-
mation on the costs of defense. Fur-
therrnore, the insured, in attempting
to control the costs, may seek to exer-
cise more direction and control over
the defense. The iower the limits of
insurance available in relation to the
potential loss and costs of defense, the
more risk the insurer will take if it
does not accede to the insureds de-
mands for direction and control. This
is an area in which the insurer may be
exposed to tisk of claims for bad faith
or excess exposure. Indeed, one actu-
ary author believes that the conflicts
raised and the rights of the insured in
the face of the confl.icts increase the
chances that the insurer will have no
limit on its liability for losses ot for
expenses of defense and the chance
that the insurance defense counsel will
be liable to the insured for malprac-
.11
tlCe.
Reservation of rights
There is no conflict if the insurer
elects to defend unconditionally, since
estoppel will later prevent the insurer
from withdrawing defense.lz FIow-
ever, if the insurer defends under
reservation of rights, there is potential
conflict, since the carder may only be
concemed about the interim costs of
defending while the insured must
worry about the ultimate cost and
payment of loss. Where the insurance
policy contains DWL provisions, the
insurer may 6nd itself giving notice of
reservation of right that it ¡vill ulti-
mately v¡ithdraw when defense expen-
ditures exceed the limits of liability. If
the insurer defends under reservadon
of right to withdraw when the policy
limit is exceeded, it is defending under
a conflict insofar as it may provide a
token defense, or provide a "uÅn at
any cost" defense while failing to work
for the lowest possible settlement.
Control of the defense
Where counsel is defending un-
der a DWL policy and where cost of
defense coupled with the potential loss
paFnent likely will exceed policy lim-
its, a conflict may arise with regard to
the conduct of the insured's defense.Â vigorous defense by counsel may
quickly deplete the policy limit and
allow the insurer to withdrav¡ leaving
the indemnity limit exhausted and the
insured exposed. When defense costs
are subtracted from the indemnity
limit, defense counsel has substantial
power to affect the insured's ability to
respond to settlement offers or ver-
dicts. Consequentl¡ under conflict
logic, the insurer should cede the right
to select counsel to the insured unless
the limit is so substanúal that there is
no potential to exhaust it. The nsk to
the carrier "who acts wrongfully in
32 South Ewing,
Suite 309
P. O. Box 749
Helena, Montana 59624
(406) 449-8889
Fax: (406) 449-4083
MONTLAW is now on the lnternet
Our Website at http://nvwyv.statereporter.com is updated daily:
- 23 Databases of CourUAgency Opinions (yearly subscription)
- Directory of legal profess¡onals (free) - Legal viewpoints and articles (free)
- Links to other legalweb sites (free) - National and Montana legal news (free)
October Charter Subscription Special (offer good until October 31, lg99):
$99 per month, per f¡rmtagency per locat¡on - unl¡mited usage
Catt 1-8OO-876-0636to search the MONTLAW databases free during a 1 week trial
subscription.
Pecn 14 TnreLTnpNos - AurunaN 1999
satisfying its duty to defend' is the
potential for being estopped from
denying coverage beyond the limit.'"
Under a DWL polic¡ the in-
sured, proceeditg i" its own defense,
has a direct interest in keeping the
attomey fees at a minimum and in
controlling the defense. If the insurer
refuses to defend, the insuted v¡ill
contend that it is abadfuth breach. If
the insurer defends, the
insured may fault the
decision to defend in-
stead of settling and
will likely dema¡rd set-
tlement for any figure
within policy limits.
Many insurers offedng
directors' and officers' coverage avoid
this problem by selling policies that
are not only DWL but contain no
duty to defend. These are indemnity
only policies under which the insurer
reimburses defense expenditures only
after the insured selects counsel, con-
trols the defer'se, and submits the
defense bill.
Duty to settle
Once the DWL insurer has de-
temrined that there is coverage or has
undertaken defense outright or under
reservation of rights, it is bound also
by a duty to settle if settlement is in
the insured's interests. Standatd lan-
guage in the basic insuring agreement
in liabfity policies reserves to the in-
surer the discretion to settle a claim.
Because the insurers have reserved to
themselves the right to settle, the
courts have found that thev also have
certain duties'to settle.to 'ihe United
States District Court for Montana in
Jessen v. O'DanieÍs in 1962 found
one of the duties to be "negotiating
for a settlement where a fair and hon-
est appraisal ofthe case requires such
action." In the landmark case of
Communale u. Ttaders & General
fns. Co. in Califomia in 195816, the
court said protection by way of settle-
ment was one of the benefits that
inured to the insured under a policy
and that, as a matter of good faith and
fair dealing the insured owed a duty
to settle in appropriate cases. The
In determining whether to settle, the insurer must give
the interests of the insured at least as much
consideration as it gives to its own interests.
court there said that "in deterrnining
whether to setde, the insurer must
give the interests of the insured at
least as much consideration as it gives
to its own interests; and that when
there is great risk of a recovery
beyond the policy limits so that the
most reasonable manner of disposing
of the claim is a settlement which can
be made within those limits, a consid-
eradon in good faith of the insured's
interest req-tlres the insurer to settle
the claim." " in Ctisci u. The Secu-
rity fnsurance Company of New
Ifaven, Connecticur,tt th. court said
that the test to deternine whether
an insurer has given consideration
to the interests of the insured is
"whether a prudent insurer u¡ithout
policy limits would have accepted the
settlement offer."le There is nothing
that exempts the insurers with DWL
provisions from these setdement
obligations.
Demand for settlement within the
policy litnils
Insurers take demands for policy
limits sedously, since their rejection is
considered tantamorint to declaring
the policy limitless.2o The insurer'i
dilemma in DWL policies is knowing
what exactly constitutes a policy limit
demand. It could be 1) an offer to
setde for the policy limit or less than
the policy limit, 2) an offet to settle
for the balance of the policy limit after
subtracting defense costs to date, or
3) an offer to setde for the reasonable
amount that will be left after deduc-
tion of reasonably predicted defense
costs. Given the pressure that can be
exerted on settlement negotiations by
placing the insurer in a situation of
potential bad faith, it will only be a
matter of time before such issues are
litigated.
The conflict for the plaintifPs
attomey
If available insurance contains
DWL provisions, aggressive tactics by
plaintifPs counsel may not be in the
best interest of the claimant because
every dollar plaintifPs counsel forces
the defense to spend is a dollar not
available for settlement or payment of
the verdict. PlaintifFs counsel will
have much more in-
centive to make eady
attempts to negotiate
settlement and to ne-
gotìate agreement on
limiting drscovery,
pretrial modons, and
other matters that can
waste the asset represented by the
indemnity limit. This may prove to be
an incentive for cooperation since the
defense attomey also must be atten-
tive to limiting costs of defense for the
protection of the insured.
If settlement attempts by plain-
tiffs counsel meet with rejection or an
aggressive starice by the defense,
plaintiff faces the prospect of fighting
a battle that will reduce the money
below that necessary for settlement or
satisfaction ofvetdict. In such a situa.
tion, plaintiff has every incentive to
attempt to manipulate the insurer into
a position of having made a bad faith
decision by refusing to settle and en-
gagng in e4pensive defense. Plaintiff
may have an aJly in the insured v¡ho
hopefrrlly will have independent coun-
sel to monitor the decisions of the
insurer.
Il¡ithd¡awal of defense on exhaus-
fie¡1 ef limifs
Norrnally, if an insurer has un-
dertaken defense of a clum without a
reservation of rights, v¡ithdrawal is out
of the question." In Transatnerica
fns. Gtoup w Chubb and Son, fnc.,2
the court held that the insurer was
estopped to deny coverage where it
had defended for ten months, citing
the facts that the insurer chose coun-
sel, conducted the defense, did the
initial investigation, and controlled ne-
gotiations." The basic insuring agree-
ment in a DWL policy will generally
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contain a provision allowing the in-
surer to withdraw when the limit has
been exhausted by claims expenses or
loss payment. Flowever, even under a
DWL polic¡ withdrawal may some-
times be thu/afted. Courts generally
estop insurers from withdrawing even
when they have policy rights to do so
1) if the case is too near trial, 2) if the
insurer has done something to preju-
dice the insured, or 3) if the insurer
has defended for a long pedod of
time.'o If the policy contains clear
DWL provisions and a clear right of
the insurer to withdraw upon exhaus-
tion of the limits by expenses, cate-
godes (1) and (3) should not present
problems of prejudice since counsel
can conlinue defending and the only
change will be in who pays. Ffowever,
if the insurer and the insured have
disagreed on defense versus settle-
ment, the insured u'ill, under (2), con-
tend that the insurer has in the coutse
of defending prejudiced the case by
exhausting the pool of money left for
settlement or verdict. While the in-
sured could seek a remedy for such a
v/rong aftet ít had defended itself by
b.i"g"S an acüon for breach of con-
tract for failute to settle, there is ¿ risk
that a court would simply disallow the
withdrawal.
Furthetmore, if the insurer is
held to have wrongfully withdrawn,
the majority nrle is that the insured
does not have to defend itself and may
settle the case without consent.2s Ai
that point, the insuted only has a duty
to cooperate butrnot minimize the
Írsurers exposure.
Does the policy really provide de-
fense within limits?
!íhile professional liability poli-
cies and directors and officers liability
policies have long contained express
DWL provisions, the courts have re-
cendy hosted disputes about whethet
cettain Commercial General Liability
'CGL" policies provide defense
within limits. Faced with enorrnous
potential liability from the savings and
loan collapse and toxic torts cases and
the concomitant magnitude of the
costs of defense involved in such
cases, some carders attempted to read
DWL provisions into standard CGL
policies. In Bankerc Trust Co. v.
Imperial Casuahy and Indemnity
Company,'' Imperial, which had
spent $2 million defending and only
had limits of $2 million, took the
position that those defense costs
counted toward the $2 million limrt of
liability and sought a court declaration
that its coverâge was exhausted. In
fact, Impedal's policy appeared to be
a standard CGL policy with a standard
basic insuring agreement and "limits
of liability'' provision. In holding that
Impedal's policy was not DWL, the
7th Circuit said:
"Impedal believes
that its policy is among the
minority that counts de-
fense e¡penditures toward
the limit of liability. It did
not tell LKA or its other
insured so in 1985, when it
issued the policy; indeed,
Imperial's interpretation of
its policy appears to be a
recent discovrry.""
Noting that federal courts had, in
unpublished decisions, ruled twice
previously that Imperial's CGL poli-
cies were not D!øL,ze Judge Easter-
brook wtote, "we publish this decision
and trust that Ln*pedal will desist."3o
The Bankers Trust and unpublished
decisions against Impedal Casuaity
and Indemnity make clear the twin
propositions that DWL cannot be read
into the standard CGL policy and that
the insurer, being the drafter of the
polic¡ is not in a position to argue that
a policy provides DWL by virtue of
ambiguity.
fnsurers have unsuccessfully at-
tempted to convince courts that their
promise to indemnifrT against judge-
ments that contain attomey fees or
costs means that the pohcy is a DWL
policy. See, for example, Planet Ins.
Co. v. Mead Reinsutance Cory.u'
And in Grunewald & Adams v.
Lloyds of London,32 the insurer tried
to persuade the court that the fact¡hat
the insured's deductible applied to
costs and exp,enses made the policy a
DWL policy." The appellate court
ruled that costs of defense were in-
cluded only in the deductible and not
in the definition of aggregate liabiJity.3a
Ambiguity may prevent the court
from enforcing a DnØL provision. In
Bnnníng u. CN\"" the court found
that the juxtaposition of three differ-
ent clauses on three different pages
along with the use of the separate
tefrns '1oss" and "claims" would allow
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a reasonable interpretation that the
policy would provide both defense
costs and the $3 million limit of liabil-
ity coverage.
On the other hand, a court will
enforce an insurance policy that ex-
pressly provides for DWL. In
Ifelfand v. National Union FÍrc In-
sutance Com,o"ny,ou the Court of
'\ppeal found the policy was not am-bþous_ and was "self-consuming" in
nature." The court noted that the
policy definition of "loss" included
defense costs and that defense costs
were payable against the limits of lia-
bfity just like any other element of
"loss." The policy contaihed a caption
to an endorsement that said "COSTS,
CT{ÄRGES AND EXPENSES AND
DEFENSE INCLUDED IN LIM-
ITS OF LIABILITY, and that the
endorsement stated that when pay-
ment not exceeding the "Limit of Lia-
bility has to be made to dispose of a
claìm, costs, charges, expenses and
settlements shall be payable up to the
Limit ofliabilit ."cs^'
Sometimes the issue is whether
the primary insurer can count defense
costs in exhausting its limits and trig-
genng coverage of the excess insurer.
In Coleman Company, fnc. v. CaIí-
fornia L\nion fns. Co.,3e the primary
carier sought a declaration that its
policy was DWL to escape having to
pay costs of defense when the ultjmate
verdict would likely have to be paid by
the excesb carÅer. Such issues are not
unusual between excess and primary
carders, who attempt to shift defense
costs to each other.
Statutory Law on Defense ìVithin
T.imits
Some states have enacted
statutes tegulating or prohibiting
DWL provisions in insurance policies.
llowever, what little regulation of
DWL provisions exists in state
statutes consists of prohibiting DWL
outright only on certain types of insur-
ance, i.e., auto insurance or low limit
policies, and ailowing the commis-
sioner discretion in the high risk cov-
erages, i.e., professional liability, envi-
ronmental, and large commercial dsk.
Only one state, Oregon, requires that
the policy contain any panicular notice
provisions.{ Montana prohibits any
provision in a casualty insurance forrn
'þetrnitting defense costs within lim-
its, except as perrnitted by the, com-
missioner in his discretion."*' The
stahrte gives no guidance to aid the
commissioner's exercise of discretion,
and DWL provisions are common in
Montana for E&O and D&O policies.
Conclusion
If DWL was adopted to contain
the unpredictability of defense costs in
the face of increasing complexity of
litigation, one cannot help but think
that it was urìnecessaqz. Simple adop-
tion of a "limits of defense" provision
similar to a limit of liability with dis-
closure on the declarations page would
have p romoted certainty.
ïhe problem with adoption of
the DWL provisions is that they en-
gender conflicts that did not exist in
the standard forrn policies. DWL pro-
visions produce conflicts berween the
insured and insurer that heighten the
risk of bad faith or excess coverage
claims against the insurer. They also
increase the number of situations in
which courts may rule that the insurer
has a policy that is limitless for defense
a¡rd for indemnity. It may be a fact,
however, that the financial benefit of
DWL provisions to the insurers u'ill
ourweigh the detriment of any poten-
tial bad faith or excess claims suits.
Counsel must understa¡rd the poten-
tial conflict inherent in DWL policy
provisions.
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